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Abstract
Hiis paper develops general equilibrium conditions for urban areas where
a pure public good is provided at a level decided upon by majority voting.
Models with a property tax and a head tax and external land ownership are
analysed, and equilibrium solutions are compared using a specific form for
the utility function. The optimal city with a head tax is characterized
and the solution Is compared to the majority voting equilibrium, again using
a specific utility function. Models where aggregate land rent is divided
equally among the urban residents are also developed.

Spatial Majority Voting Equilibria and
the Provision of Public Goods
by
Jan K. Brueckner
The purpose of this paper is to characterize spatial equilibrium in
an urban area with a pure public good whose output is chosen by majority voting.
Models with a property tax and a head tax and external land ownership are
analysed, and majority voting equilibria are compared by computing soljotlons
using a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The optimal city with the heal tax Is
analysed and the solution Is compared to the majority voting equilibrism with
the head tax using a CES utility function. Models where aggregate lasi rent is
divided equally among the urban residents are considered in the last j«rt of
the paper.
The available papers dealing with urban spatial equilibrium wjLch a
pure public good are unsatlsfactoiry. Wile [3] presents a model with aa
extremely restrictive property tax formulation which drastically oversimplifies
the consumer choice problem. Barr's analysis [1] also suffers from Inadequate
treatment of the decision process by which the level of the public good is set.
This paper integrates, for the first time, models of majority voting «nd urban
spatial equilibrium, in addition, the general equilibrium models in the paper
represent an improvement over the partial equilibrium majority voting models
analysed by authors such as Barr and Davis [2].
I.
The models in this paper incorporate standard features of urban spatial
analysis. All consumers commute to the CBD, which is the only employment center
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In the city, and the CBD output is exported at a fixed price. The CBD is a
dimensionless point, and labor is the only input to CBD production. The wage,
y, is independent of the level of employment by the assumptions of constant
returns to scale in the CBD production process and perfect competition in the
export market. The public good, z, is imported at a fixed unit price c, and
the commuting cost function is linear in distance x from the CBD: t(x) = tx.
More general assumptions which would not restrict t(x), permit y to depend on
the level of CBD employment, and allow the unit price of z to depend on the level
of z would greatly complicate or prevent model solutions tising specific forms
for the utility function.
A strong assumption is that people consume only land, 1, and the public
good, which will imply that per capita land consumption is constant throughout
the urban area, a radical departure from the normal conclusion that land con-
sumption increases with distance from the CBD. Analysis of majority voting equi-
libria in a three-good model where per capita land consumption could vary over
space would be prohibitively difficult. Until Section IV of the paper, it is
assumed that the urban land rent is paid to absentee landlords.
Since z is a pure public good, its consumption does not depend on x.
Because the consumer utility level must be invariant over x in equilibrium,
the consumption of land cannot vary with distance in equilibrium. Thus, the
urban equilibrium is characterized by a consumption bundle (Jl,z) and a utility
level u B u(£,z). In addition, the equilibrium urban population n must be
housed within the urban periphery x, and land rent at the periphery must equal
agricultural rent. Either u or n must be exogenous; the city is either open
to migration so that n adjusts until the utility level equals the prevailing
external level, or it is closed to migration with n fixed and u endogenous ly
determined.
no b;






Since z is purely public, consumption of z is identically equal to out-
put. Congestion would imply that consumption of z depends both on output and
the size of the population consuming the output.
Two methods of financing the public good are considered: a property
tax and a head tax. Consumers are assumed to know c, the unit price of the
public good. The following definition formalizes the equillbrliim concept
used in the analysis.
Definition ; A majority voting equilibrium is a vector e* =»
(£*, z*, u*, n*) such that there does not exist a z 1* z* and
a set of consumers N larger than n*/2 such that for all
ieN, (.i..,z) is affordable consumption bundle for consumer i and
u(Jl ,z) > u*.
Any vector e-not satisfying the definition will not be a majority voting
equilibrium because there will exist a z^ ^ z such that z' would attract
the votes of a majority of the urban residents in a contest with z.
We now 2inalyze equilibrium with the property tax. The property tax
rate 6 which balances the city's budget is 6 = cz/V, where V is the total
value of land in the urban area. The budget constraint of a consumer living
at X Is r(x)J!,(l-t«) = y-tx, or
y - tx
r(x)(l + cz/V) ' (1)
where r(x) is land rent at x. The consumer at x maximizes utility subject
(1) . The maximand is
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Slnce consumers are perfectly competitive, they assume their consumption
decision has no effect on V, aggregate land value. Land value V is endo-
genous in the model, but each consumer takes it as given in making his
consumption decision.




Uj^(£,z) r(x)(l + cz/V)^ " V+HI ' ^^^
2
substituting for r(x) from (1). Equation (3) does not involve x, which
implies that all consumers are satisfied with the same bundle (l*, z*)
in equilibrium. Letting the equilibrium value of V equal V*, the equilibrium
land rent function is r(x) = (y-tx)/Jl*(l + cz*/V*) , and thus the budget
constraint in equilibrium is «- = il*(l + cz*/V*)/(l + cz/V*). The absolute
value of the slope of the constraint, |dJl/dzl, is J!.*(l + cz*/V*) (c/V*)/
(1 + cz/V*)^, which equals c£*/(V* + cz*) at (Jl*, z*) . Since (3) holds at
(£*, z*, V*), the equilibrium budget constraint is tangent to the equilibrium
indifference curve at (£*, z*) for all x. This establishes that the majority
voting equilibrium is one of voter unanimity; no individual 1 prefers an
affordable bundle {i, , z) with z j^ z* to the equilibrium bundle (£*, z*).
In equilibrium, the land rent function based on V must generate
aggregate land value equal to V. That is, V must satisfy
f 27rx r(x)dx - V, (4)
or, substituting for r(x) from (1)
,
I
2irx (y - tx) dx - V. (5)







f ^ (y - tx) dx = V + cz, (6)
which states that the integral of land area times disposable income per
acre over the city should equal the total value of land plus the cost of
the public good
.
The complete set of equilibrium conditions for the city with a
property tax is
£(1 + cz/V) ''a ^'^
n£ = irx^ (8)






u = u(£,z) (11)
Equation (7) states that land rent equals the agricultural rent r. at the
urban periphery, while (8) states that the city houses its population, and
(11) gives the utility level. The unknowns are A, z, u, x, n, and V, and
since there are only five equations, either u or n mvist be exogenous.
The striking feature of the property tax equilibrium is voter unani-
mity over the equilibrium consumption bundle. In the model with the head
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tax, which is developed next, there is disagreement over the optimal con-
siimption bundle in equilibrium; the majority voting process is central to
the outcome. With the head tax, each individual pays an amount cz/n. The
budget constraint of a consumer living at x is r(x)£ + cz/n =• y - tx or
n y - tx - cz/n . (12)
r(x)




u (£,z) n r(x)
di
n(y - tx) - cz ' (13)
substituting for r(x) from (12). In equilibrium, % and z must be the same
at all X. Thus the LHS of (13) is constant over x while the RHS Is increasing
In X, and (13) holds at only one value of x. This is Illustrated In Figure 1,
where the consumption bundle is (A', z'), which implies that the land rent
function is r(x) = (y - tx - cz'/n)/£'. In the Figure, the line C Is the
budget line of the consumer living at x' , the x for which (13) holds when % =
V and z = z'. Line D is the budget line of a consumer living at x > x'
,
where r(x) < r(x'), and lines A and B are budget lines for consumers living
Inside x' . Suppose x' is greater than the median distance of consumers from
the CBD, the distance % such that n/2 consumers live Inside S:. Then the number
of consumers who have budget lines like A and B In Figure 1 will exceed n/2.
In this situation, the point f cannot be a majority voting equilibrium. To see
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this, note that eacn individual having a budget line with slope less in
absolute value than that of line A will prefer z" and the associated Z value
on his budget line (a bundle such as b) to the bundle (£.', z'). Since x'
is greater than the median distance x, we can always find a z" and a corres-
pcKiding budget line A such that the number of consumers with budget lines
less steep than A exceeds n/2. This means that in a contest between z' and
z", z" will receive the votes of a majority of the population, establishing
that point f could not have been a majority voting equilibrium. The same
argument can be made if x' is less than the median distance x. We have
shown that a majority voting equilibrium must have the property that (13)
holds with X = X. In equilibrium, the consumer at x is satisfied with his
consumption bundle, while, at the equilibrium land rents, consimers inside
X want less Z and more z snd consumers outside x desire more i and less 2.
- Since land consumption is constant, x can be easily expresed in terms
of X, the distance to the urban periphery. By the definition of x, the number
2 —2 2 —2
of people living inside X, or ttx /£, equals n/2, or ttx /2l, Thus 25 = x
and X = x/t'^T









"1^^'^^ n(y - tx/v/2) - cz
u = u(i,z) (17)
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Equatlon (14) says that land rent at the urban periphery equals agricultural
rent, and the other conditions are already familiar. Since there are five
unknowns, Jl, z, u, n, and x, and four equations, either u or n must be
exogenous. In the head tax equilibrium, we have seen the emergence in a
spatial context of the median voter principle, which is familiar from non-
spatial models of public goods provision (see Barr and Davis),
II.
In this section, we con^are the head tax and property tax equilibrium
solutions. Since the comparison is impossible for a general utility function,
computations with specific functions were attempted. When r. > 0, comparison
of the property and head tax solutions using a Cobb-Douglas utility function is
impossible. Solution of the systems yields expressions which do not allow
unambiguous comparisons of the equilibrium values of the variables. However,
when r. = 0, the equation systems are simplified and complete comparisons of
the head and property tax equilibria in both the open and closed city cases are
achievable with a Cobb-Douglas utility fiinction. The CES function allows a
comparison of the equilibria in the closed city case, although no results are
available for the open city case. Since the CES results are incomplete, only
the Cobb-Douglas solutions are presented below.
a 6
When r = and the utility function is u - Jl z , the property tax
equilibrium system (7) - (11) becomes
y - tX - (18)
n£ = irx^ (19)
•i: -iSl-j-c-
-9-
M = ^ (20)
az V + cz
iryx^ - 2i;tx^/3 = £(V + cz) (21)
u=£°'2^ (22)
where, in (21), the Integration in (9) has been performed. The head tax
system (lA) - (17) becomes
y - tX - cz/n = (23)
n£ = ux2 (24)
U ^ cl (25)
"^
n(y - tx/*^) - cz
u = ^"z^ (26)
For the open city case, u is exogenous and was set equal to unity. Since
solving (20) for z in terms of V yields z = 3V/(a-B)c, a positive value for z
requires a > 6. Solving for 8. in terms of z from (22) with u = 1 yields z =
—a/S
I which allows V to be expressed in terms of I. Then, using (18), (21)












where the subscript P refers to the property tax equilibrium. Solution of (23)




/ \ 2 / 3^
',
ct
, crf3(l-l/^) ; i o+ed-l/.^) (28)
where H denotes the head tax equilibrium. Tedious calculation shows that B/3a
exceeds the expression in brackets in (28). Since these expressions are raised
to a negative power,
^g > ^pJ land consun^tion in the head tax equilibrium
exceeds land consumption in the property tax equilibrium. Since the consumption
bundle Is on the unit indifference curve in both cities, £ > £ implies
Zg < Zp. The output of the public good is greater with the property tax than
with the head tax. The solution of the head tax equilibrium also yields
^ a+g(l-l//T) ^ ^
where x^ is from (18). Since x^^ < x^ and £^ > £p, n < n from (19) or
(2A). Thus, when the city is open, the property tax results in lower land
consunqitlon, higher public good cccsumptlon, larger urban area, and larger
4
population than does the head tax.
tflien the city Is closed, u Is free to vary but n is fixed. Equation
(29) still holds, which since n is fixed, implies Aj < -^ using (19) or
(24). Solving for z and z in terms of x and Xp yields z = n(y-tx„)/c
and Zj, = en(y-2xp/3t)/ac. After substituting for x^ and Xp from (29),





an Inequality which can easily be established. Thus, when the city is
closed, the property tax leads to higher land consumption, higher public
good consuiqjtion and larger urban area than does the head tax. Since con-
sumption of both goods is greater with the property tax, Up > u^j the
closed city reaches a higher utility level with the property tax than with
the head tax. Presumably, the inefficiency of the head tax is related to the
lack of unanimity among voters in the head tax equilibrium. The results of
this section are summarized in the top half of Table 1.
III.
The next step in the analysis is the characterization of the optimal
city under the different tax regimes, and a comparison of the optimum to the
majority voting equilibrium. Clearly, optimization makes sense only in the
closed city case. The optimality conditions under the property tax regime with
r . > are extremely complex, preventing comparison of the majority voting
equilibrium and the optimum. When r. = 0, the optimality conditions lead to
a nonsensical solution with V = 0. For these reasons, the analysis in this
section is concerned only with the optimal city under the head tax regime. In
computing the optimum, the welfare of the absentee landlords is not considered;
the goal is to maximize the utility level of the urban residents only. The
analysis is carried out for arbitrary agricultural rent r..
The problem is to maximize u(£,z) subject to the constraints nt
—2 —









The interpretation of (31) is straightforward. Land rent r(x) equals
(y - tx - cz/n)/Jl, which can be expressed r + t(x - x)/il using the second
constraint. Expenditure on land at x, r(x)£, equals r £ + t/nJl/ir - tx, using
the first constraint. Differentiating the last expression with respect to £
yields the denominator of the RHS of (31). Thus, (31) says that the ratio of
the marginal cost of z to the marginal cost of £ equals the siun of the marginal
rates of subsituation between z and i, the familiar Samuelson condition.
The optimal city is characterized by (31) and the two constraints. Sinci
(31) bears no relation to (16) in the head tax equilibrium system, the majority
voting equilibrium does not yield the maximal value of u. It is interesting
to note, however, that if consumers recognize the dependence of land rent on
their consumption decision, so that the budget constraint is perceived as
y - r.i - t(/n)l/¥-x) - cz/n = 0, then consumer maximization results in the
first-order condition (31), and consumers are unanimous over the optimal con-
sumption bundle since (31) does not depend on x. This result is of course
not surprising; it says that if consumers engage in non-competitive behavior,
they can raise their level of utility. Wile has noticed a similar fact in his
analysis, but he misleadingly attributes the result to the consumers' failure
to account for the spatial externality they impose on others: higher land
consumption by one individual imposes higher transportation costs on others due
to the expansion of the city. The correct explanation is that consumers can
reach a higher utility level when they recognize the influence of their con-
sumption on the prices they pay than when they ignore this effect.
It is possible to compare the majority voting equilibrium and the
optimum using a CES utility function. For the CES function
u =(a£ + (l-a)z ) , the marginal rate of substitution u /u is
((l-o)/a)(il/z)
.
Solving the head tax equilibrium system for I yields
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, P+1 p p+1i^ £ (r, + t(l - lly/l)i/^hl) = (-) (y - t^lAiT-- r,£) (32)
oc A c A
Solving for the optimum we have.
- „ p+1
.
„ P , P+1i^ £ (r, + t^7^/2) = (-) (y - t^I77 - r .£) (33)
a A c A
It can be deduced as follows from (32) and (33) that t- < iy^ when p > -h,
where 0? and MV denote optimum and majority voting. It is easy to show that
for ^ > -h, the LHS of (32) and the LIIS of (33) are increasing in t. The
EHS of these equations is decreasing in £, since p > -1, ard for any £
the LHS of (33) exceeds the LHS of (32). This means that, on the downward-
sloping curve corresponding to the common RES of (32) and (33) , the inter-
section of the curve representing the LHS of (33) is uphill from intersec-
tion of the curve representing the LHS of (32). This establishes £»p < £^.
Since n is fixed, £_^ < L implies jc-.^ < x,„. In addition, since we Vxicm
UqP > Uj^jy. it must be true that z^p > z^^^ given that l^^ < l^^^. These
results clearly hold for the Cobb-Douglas utility function t z , which
corresponds to the case p = 0, and it is easy to show they also hold for
u = ilz
, Bii'l-a. Since the elasticity of substitution a
equals l/(l+p) , the condition p > -h is equivalent to a < 2. The conclusion
is that as long as a < 2 , or £ and z are not too substitutable in consimp-
tion, the optimal city has higher public good consumption, lower land con-
suiiq)tion, and smaller urban area than the city which emerges in the roa.ioritv
voting equilibrium. These results are summarized in the bottom half of the
Table 1. Presumably, land consumption in the optimal city is lower because

-lA-
the effect of the consumption level on land rent is taken into account.
The failure of the head tax equilibrium to maximize urban utility
does not mean the equilibrium is Pareto inefficient. This is true because
aggregate rent payments are less at the optimum than in the head tax
equilibrium; urban residents are better off at the optimum but absentee .
landlords suffer a loss of income. To see this, note that expressing r(x)
as r. + t(x - x/£ and computing aggregate rent, / 2iTxr(x)dx , yields,
after substituting for £ , irr x + ntx/3. Since aggregate rent is
increasing in x and x.^ < x^, the income of absentee landlords is
less at the optimum than in the head tax equilibrium.
IV.
In this section, we consider a closed city where r . = and the income
of each consumer is augmented by an amount V/n, his shsire of aggregate land
rent. The most natural interpretation of this assumption is that the govern-
ment owns all the land in the area and redistributes aggregate rents equally
to consumers. A less satisfying interpretation is that each of the n consumers
owns a pie slice of land of angular width 2ir/n that extends Indefinitely out-
ward from the CBD.
The budget constraints of consumers under the property tax and head
tax respectively are ril(l + cz/V) = y - tx + V/n and
rl + cz/n = y - tx + V/n . As before, constimers are perfectly competitive
with respect to V. The first-order conditions for utility maximization
under the property tax and the head tax are (10) and
u„/u, = c/(n(y - tx) - cz + V) respectively. As before, the property tax
equilibrium is characterized by voter unanimity, while in the head tax
equilibrium, the first-order condition holds only at x = x. Other familiar
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equilibrium conditions require that land rent equal zero at x, n£ = ttx^
,
and /J 2.xr(x)dx = V . Substituting for r(x) fron. the budget constraints,
it is easy to show that the last condition is equivalent to
cz/n = y - 2tx/3 under both the property tax and head tax regimes. Thus,
the property tax equilibrium system Is
y - tx + V/n = (36)
n£ = TTx'^ (37)




u.(£,z) V + cz
The head tax equilibrium is characterized by (37), (38),
y -tx + (V - cz)/n = 0, and "2^"! "^ '^/('^(y " tx//2) - cz + V) .
Equations (37) and (38) define a locus of points cz/n = y - 2t/n)i/iT/3
which contains the consimption bundles for both tax regimes. The optimal
bundle is the point where the locus is tangent to an indifference curve,
or where
1 ntx
Clearly the optimal (£, z) bundle is the same for both tax regimes. What
differs between the regimes is the value of V , which is derived from the
appropriate boundary condition on r once the optimal bundle is known.
It follows directly from (36) - (39) that the property tax
equilibrium is identical to the optimum, a striking result. The RHS of (39)
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becomes 3cil/ntx after substituting for V and z from (36) and (38). It is
easy to see by exaiainlng the head tax equations that the head tax regime does
not generate the optimum.
The efficiency of the property tax in the model with rent redistri-
bution invites an analogy between the property tax equilibrium and a Lindahl
equilibrium from the theory of public goods. In the Lindahl equilibrium,
consumers with different tastes and incomes are charged different unit prices
for the public good w^hich are desigried to lead each consumer to deirand the
eaxae socially optimal level of the yoocL. The form of the budget constraint
with the property tax leads to the same kind of unanimity among consumers in
the urban area by eliminating the effect of location on the desired consumption
bundle, and the structure of the model guarantees the equivalence of the
optimal and desired bundles. It is easy to show, however, that this equivalence
disappears when r > 0. Apparently, the property tax becomes Inefficient when
the model is not "closed," when productive activity generating positive land
rent occurs outside the city.
V.
This paper shows that the analysis of majority voting equilibria
in an urban spatial context can generate a number of interesting results,
further evidence of the rich theoretical implications of the simple urban
spatial model. In addition, the analysis has demonstrated the ease with
which the notion of a majority voting equilibrium may be applied to yield
results of practical significance.
The models presented in this paper are unrealistic because the public
good is not subject to congestion and because only two goods are consumed.
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Nevertheless, If we are willing to grant that the models capture some essential
features of reality, there is a public policy lesson Inherent in the results:
in a world where migration is difficult and cities may be viewed as closed,
a property tax system may be inherently superior to a head tax regime (or to
an income tax, irfiich is equivalent to a head tax when Incomes are equal) as
a mechanism for raising revenue for public expenditure. Unajiimity among voters
and a higher urban utility level result from the property tax system, regardless
of land ownership arrangements. Happily, municipalities rely heavily on the
property tax as a source of revenue for public expenditures. Hence, present
institutional arrangements cannot be faulted on efficiency grounds, at least
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2 2 2
The second derl rative of (1) is 2c i!,/(V+cz) > 0, which means the budget
constraint is c mvex. The second-order condition requires that the curvature
of the indiffer ince curve be greater than that of the budget constraint at
the solution to (3). V/e assume the second-order condition is satisfied.
In this case th€ second-order condition requires only the usual convexity of
indifference cui ves.
Fortunately, it ts possible to show that the second-order condition for the
consumer equilit cium with the property tax is satisfied when a > 6. The rate
2
of change of the slope of the Cobb-Douglas indifference curve is 6£(o;+6)/(az) .
This must exceec the second derivative of the budget constraint at the solution
for the solutioi to be a maximum. From footnote 1 this requires (a+6)/az > 2c/(V+cz)
,
where (20) has I een used to cancel terms. Substituting for z in terms of V from
the property ta : solution, the inequality reduces to a > 3.
Since the const: aint y - t/n£/TT - v H = cz/n is convex, the second-order
order condition equires that the curvature of the indifference curve exceed
the curvature of the constraint at the solution to (31). However, it is not
possible to veri y whether the second-order condition is satisfied for the
CES solution. Al we can do is assume the condition holds.
Since the const: aint cz/n = y - 2t/ni/Tr/3 is again convex, the second-
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